greyman-please shut up until you have an actual quote from AR or GS

it is negativeness of the highest order-my guess is you are a Wednesday fan stirring-just like Brian the blade last night on Football heaven-given that no-one who posts on here was at the &quot;chat&quot; between AR and GS it's all just malicious gossip</p>

wait until you hear from the &quot;horses mouth&quot;</p>

rant over</p>

 

Paul.d - I appreciate where you are coming from but I am not being negative. On the contrary GS is making statements. AR's comments have only come in response to the media's questions about those statements.He is trying to get players,run the team and get more points in the bag.The only point scoring HE wants to do is on Saturday.
My comments are mostly based on an understanding of how business runs (and lets face it we know football is a business.)
It is my belief that AR will now try to put the record straight and it will end in the termination of his contract sooner rather than later. That is my opinion - I thought that that is what this bulletin board was about even if those opinions are not agreed with- sorry if I am mistaken.
I do agree however that until there are further concrete developments it is best that I say no more on this subject until my next post - which I expect to be - I told you so!

P.S. No way am I a Sheffield Tuesday fan.

 

fair enough

my guess would be that yesterday's chat sorted things-otherwise AR would have gone by now-his leaving of  Oldham shows he doesn't suffer fools galdly

 

RE: fair enough

I hope you are right.
I heard that GS was not happy with Cadimarteri because of the drugs thing yet AR seems to have won the day.
Still think we are in the Doldrums - the calm before the storm
I hope I am wrong.

 

RE: fair enough

heard from who? I'd only believe it if GS told you face to face-I get fed up of rumour mongering -the trouble is Radio Sheff ,the Star and lazy journalists log on here and quote rumour as fact and things spiral out of control

 

RE: fair enough

My info is GS to AR to XX to me.

 

Dale Winton?

What does he know about football?

 

it's .......

the XX that bothers me-how can you be sure it's direct from AR?

 

RE: it's .......

Don't let it bother you. I reckon XX is a made up name anyway.

 

Unless it's somebody chinese....

argh I get it now!!!</p>

You go to the same chinese as Andy Ritchie and the nice chinese fewwer told you when you ordered a portion of chips and curry.</p>

 

RE: Unless it's somebody chinese....

I reckon XX was on the XXXX

 

RE: Unless it's somebody chinese....

Oh mock ye not! Nay! Thrice nay! (Frankie Howerd (not Brian) by the way for those of more tender years.)
When heads roll I will be able to identify xx.

 

Is it half a pint of castlemaine?

 

why wait ?

if it's true it can't do any more harm can it? and at least things would be out in the open
if you think about it if GS was dead set against DC he just refuses to issue a contract

 

RE: why wait ?

I didn't say he was "dead set against". I think it was verbal jousting with AR because of AR's reluctance over "dodgy character" of Kazim-Richards.

 

RE: why wait ?

you think? that means you don't know

 

RE: why wait ?

I KNOW what he said I THINK that is why he said it.We are getting into semintics now. I have just seen the time - I need to earn a crust and justify my contract. Really, really must get some work done .
Enjoyed the banter.

 

RE: why wait ?

how do you know? read this before answering!<span style="font-family: "Courier New";"></span><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Epistemology</span><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"> is one of the core areas of philosophy. Itis concerned with the nature, sources and limits of knowledge. Epistemologyhas been primarily concerned with propositional knowledge, that is, knowledgethat such-and-such is true, rather than other forms of knowledge, for example,knowledge how to such-and-such. There is a vast array of views aboutpropositional knowledge, but one virtually universal presupposition is thatknowledge is true belief, but not mere true belief (see Belief and knowledge). Forexample, lucky guesses or true beliefs resulting from wishful thinking are notknowledge. Thus, a central question in epistemology is: what must beadded to true beliefs to convert them into knowledge?<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">1 The normativeanswers: foundationalism and coherentism<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">The historicallydominant tradition in epistemology answers that question by claimingthat it is the quality of the reasons for our beliefs that converts truebeliefs into knowledge (see Epistemology,history of). When the reasons are sufficiently cogent, we have knowledge(see Rational beliefs).This is the normative tradition in epistemology (see Normative epistemology).An analogy with ethics is useful: just as an action is justified when ethicalprinciples sanction holding it (see Justification, epistemic; Epistemology and ethics).The second tradition in epistemology, the naturalistic tradition, doesnot focus on the quality of the reasons for beliefs but, rather, requires thatthe conditions in which beliefs are acquired typically produce true beliefs(see Internalism andexternalism in epistemology; Naturalized epistemology).<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Within the normativetradition, two views about the proper structure of reasons have been developed:foundationalism and coherentism (see Reasons for belief). Byfar, the most commonly held view is foundationalism. It holds that reasons reston a foundational structure comprised of 'basic' beliefs (see Foundationalism). Thefoundational propositions have autonomous justification that does not dependupon any further justification which could be provided by inferential relationsto other propositions. (Coherentism, discussed below, denies that there aresuch foundational propositions).<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">These basic beliefscan be of several types. Empiricists (such as Hume and Locke) hold that basicbeliefs exhibit knowledge initially gained through the senses or introspection(see A posteriori; Empiricism; Introspection, epistemologyof; Perception,epistemic issues in). Rationalists (such as Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza) hold that atleast some basic beliefs are the result of rational intuition (see A priori; A priori knowledge andjustification, recent work on; Rationalism). Since notall knowledge seems to be based on sense experience or introspection orrational intuition, some epistemologists claim that some knowledge is innate(see Innate knowledge; Knowledge, tacit; Kant, I.; Plato). Still others arguethat some propositions are basic in virtue of conversational contextualfeatures. (See Contextualism,epistemological; Contextualism,epistemic, recent work on).<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Foundationalistshold that epistemic principles of inference are available that allow anepistemic agent to reason from the basic propositions to the non-basic(inferred) propositions. They suggest, for example, that if a set of basicpropositions is explained by some hypothesis and additional confirming evidencefor the hypothesis is discovered, then the hypothesis is justified (see Inference to the bestexplanation). A notorious problem with this suggestion is that it is alwayspossible to form more than one hypothesis that appears equally well confirmedby the total available data, and consequently no one hypothesis seems favouredover all its rivals (see Induction,epistemic issues in; Goodman,N.). Some epistemologists have argued that this problem can be overcome byappealing to features of the rival hypotheses beyond their explanatory power.For example, the relative simplicity of one hypothesis might be thought toprovide a basis for preferring it to its rivals (see Simplicity (in scientifictheories); Theoretical(epistemic) virtues).<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">In contrast tofoundationalism, coherentism claims that every belief derives its justificationfrom inferential relationships to other beliefs (see Knowledge and justification,coherence theory of; Probabilitytheory and epistemology; Bosanquet, B.; Bradley, F.H.). Allcoherentists hold that, like the poles of a tepee, beliefs are mutuallyreinforcing. Some coherentists, however, assign a special justificatory role tothose propositions that are more difficult to dislodge from the web of belief .The set of these special propositions overlaps the set of basic propositionsspecified by foundationalism.<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">There are someobjections aimed specifically at foundationalism and others aimed specifically atcoherentism. But there is one deep difficulty with both traditional normativeaccounts. This problem, known as the 'Gettier Problem' (after a famousthree-page article by Edmund Gettier in 1963), can be stated succinctly asfollows (see Gettierproblems): suppose that a false belief can be justified (see Fallibilism), and supposethat its justificatory status can be transferred to another proposition throughdeduction or other principles of inference (see Deductive closure principle).Suppose further that the inferred proposition is true. If these suppositionscan be true simultaneously - and that seems to be the case - the inferredproposition would be true, justified (by either foundationalist or coherentistcriteria) and believed, but in many cases it clearly is not knowledge, since itis a felicitous coincidence that the truth was obtained.<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">One strategy foraddressing the Gettier Problem remains firmly within the normative tradition.It employs the original normative intuition that it is the quality of thereasons which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. This is the defeasibilitytheory of knowledge. There are various defeasibility accounts but, generally,all of them hold that the felicitous coincidence can be avoided if the reasonswhich justify the belief are such that they cannot be defeated by furthertruths (see Knowledge,defeasibility theory of).<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">2 Thenaturalistic answers: causes of belief<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">There is a secondgeneral strategy for addressing the Gettier Problem that falls outside of thenormative tradition and lies squarely within the naturalistic tradition (see Quine, W.V.). As the namesuggests, the naturalistic tradition describes knowledge as a naturalphenomenon occurring in a wide range of subjects. Adult humans may employreasoning to arrive at some of their knowledge, but the naturalists are quickto point out that children and adult humans arrive at knowledge in ways that donot appear to involve any reasoning whatsoever. Roughly, when a true belief hasthe appropriate causal history, then the belief counts as knowledge (see Knowledge, causal theory of).<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Suppose that I aminformed by a reliable person that the temperature outside the building iswarmer now than it was two hours ago. That certainly looks like a bit ofknowledge gained and there could be good reasons provided for the belief. Thenormativists would appeal to those good reasons to account for the acquisitionof knowledge. The naturalists, however, would argue that true belief resultingfrom testimony from a reliable source is sufficient for knowledge (see Social epistemology;Testimony).<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Testimony is justone reliable way of gaining knowledge (see Reliabilism). There areother ways such as sense perception, memory and reasoning. Of course, sometimesthese sources are faulty (see Memory, epistemology of).A central task of naturalized epistemology is to characterize conditionsin which reliable information is obtained (see Information theory and epistemology).Thus, in some of its forms, naturalized epistemology can be seen as abranch of cognitive psychology, and the issues can be addressed by empiricalinvestigation.<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Now let us return tothe Gettier Problem. Recall that it arose in response to the recognition thattruth might be obtained through a felicitous coincidence. The naturalistictradition ties together the belief and truth conditions of knowledge in astraightforward way by requiring that the means by which the true belief isproduced or maintained should be reliable.<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">3 Scepticism<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">The contrast betweennormative and naturalized epistemology is apparent in the way in whicheach addresses one of the most crucial issues in epistemology, namely,scepticism (see Scepticism).Scepticism comes in many forms. In one form, the requirements for knowledgebecome so stringent that knowledge becomes impossible, or virtually impossible,to obtain. For example, suppose that a belief is knowledge only if it iscertain, and a belief is certain only if it is beyond all logically possibledoubt. Knowledge would then become a very rare commodity (see Certainty; Doubt).<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Other forms ofscepticism only require that knowledge be based upon good, but not logicallyunassailable, reasoning. We have alluded to scepticism about induction. Thatform of scepticism illustrates the general pattern of the sceptical problem:there appear to be intuitively clear cases of the type of knowledge questionedby the sceptic, but intuitively plausible general epistemic principles appealedto by the sceptic seem to preclude that very type of knowledge.<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Another example willhelp to clarify the general pattern of the sceptical problem. Consider thepossibility that my brain is not lodged in my skull but is located in a vat andhooked up to a very powerful computer that stimulates it to have exactly theexperiences, memories and thoughts that I am now having. Call that possibilitythe 'sceptical hypothesis'. That hypothetical situation is clearly incompatiblewith the way I think the world is. Now, it seems to be an acceptable normativeepistemic principle that if I am justified in believing that the world is theway I believe it to be (with other people, tables, governments and so on), Ishould have some good reasons for denying the sceptical hypothesis. But, so theargument goes, I could not have such reasons; for if the sceptical hypothesiswere true, everything would appear to be just as it now does. So, there appearsto be a conflict between the intuition that we have such knowledge and theintuitively appealing epistemic principle. Thus, scepticism can be seen as oneinstance of an interesting array of epistemic paradoxes (see Paradoxes, epistemic).<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Of course,epistemologists have developed various answers to scepticism. Within thenormative tradition, there are several responses available. One of them issimply to deny any epistemic principle - even if it seems initially plausible -that precludes us from having what we ordinarily think is within our ken (see Commonsensism; Chisholm, R.M.; Moore, G.E.; Reid, T.). Anotherresponse is to examine the epistemic principles carefully in an attempt to showthat, properly interpreted, they do not lead to scepticism. Of course, there isalways the option of simply declaring that we do not have knowledge. Whateverchoice is made, some initially plausible intuitions will be sacrificed.<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Within thenaturalistic tradition, there appears to be an easy way to handle the scepticalworries. Possessing knowledge is not determined by whether we have good enoughreasons for our beliefs but, rather, whether the processes that produced thebeliefs in question are sufficiently reliable. So, if I am a brain in a vat, Ido not have knowledge; and if I am not a brain in a vat (and the world isgenerally the way I think it is), then I do have knowledge. Nevertheless, thosewithin the normative tradition will argue that we are obliged to withhold fullassent to propositions for which we have less than adequate reasons, regardlessof the causal history of the belief.<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Contextualism,mentioned earlier, responds to the sceptical problem in a way that does notfall neatly into either the normative or naturalistic tradition (see Contextualism, epistemological;Contextualism,epistemological, recent work on). There are many varieties ofcontextualism, but central to all of them is that the truth conditions of asentence or utterance attributing knowledge to someone will vary from onecontext to another. Hence, the utterance `Sarah knows that the car she left inthe parking lot is still there' will be true in one context when the standardsfor knowledge are lower than they are in a context in which the standards arethose approaching certainty. In such a high standards context, Sarah will failto know. Thus, by extension, says the contextualist, both our ordinary claimsto knowledge and the sceptical claims that we don't have knowledge can be truebecause of variations in the contexts of the utterances. So-called`invariantists' deny that there is such a contextual shift of the truth valuesof the utterances and, hence, they reject the contextualist solution to thesceptical problem.<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">4 Recentdevelopments in epistemology<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">Some recentdevelopments in epistemology question and/or expand on some aspects ofthe tradition. Virtue epistemology focuses on the characteristics of theknower rather than individual beliefs or collections of beliefs (see Virtue epistemology).Roughly, the claim is that when a true belief is the result of the exercise ofintellectual virtue, it is, ceteris paribus, knowledge. Thus, the virtueepistemologist can incorporate certain features of both the normative andnaturalist traditions. Virtues, as opposed to vices, are good, highly prizeddispositional states. The intellectual virtues, in particular, are just thosedeep dispositions that produce mostly true beliefs. Such an approachreintroduces some neglected areas of epistemology, for example, theconnection of knowledge to wisdom and understanding (see Wisdom).<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">In addition, thereare emerging challenges to certain presuppositions of traditional epistemology.For example, some argue that there is no set of rules for belief acquisitionthat are appropriate for all peoples and all situations (see Cognitive pluralism; Epistemic relativism).Others have suggested that many of the proposed conditions of good reasoning,for example 'objectivity' or 'neutrality', are not invoked in the service of gainingtruths, as traditional epistemology would hold, but rather they areemployed to prolong entrenched power and (at least in some cases) distort theobjects of knowledge (see Feministepistemology).<o /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";">In spite of thesefundamental challenges and the suggestions inherent in some forms ofnaturalized epistemology that the only interesting questions areempirically answerable, it is clear that epistemology remains a vigorousarea of inquiry at the heart of philosophy.<o /></span></p><table width="100%" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" style="width: 100%;" class="MsoNormalTable"><tbody><tr style=""><td style="padding: 0cm;"><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><span style="color: windowtext; text-decoration: none;"><span style=""></span></span><o /></span></p> </td> </tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Courier New";"><o> </o></span></p>

 

RE: why wait ?

can you find a meaning for semintics?

 

RE: why wait ?

You win.
Wish I could paste things in but I struggle to type things properly. Slysdexia Rules KO.